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The article analyses some changes of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia and social phenomena over thirty 
years of transition and transformation of the economy and 
society. The findings point at very frequent radical changes 
in key institutions and the tendency to believe that prob-
lems can be solved via formal legislative approach. Most 
of Croatia’s main problems (political and societal) arise 
from the wrong choice and performance of democratic 
and market institutions and understanding of integrations. 
The adopted legislation has not provided for predictability, 
reliability, or system stability in key areas of human inter-
action. The findings indicate an ambivalent attitude of the 
actors towards the state, the political system, and the rule 
of law. After three decades of transition and transforma-
tion, the failure of the established model of political gov-
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ernance is visible. In order to change the model of political 
governance, there must be an agreement about the polit-
ical role model and the consensus about the fundamental 
values of society.
Keywords: post-socialist transition, transformation, de-
mocracy, constitution, society, governance, Croatia
1. Introduction
The article deals with the outcomes of key institutional choices and chang-
es. An analysis of constitutional amendments refers to three periods of 
Croatian statehood: 1990-2000; 2000-2010, and 2010-2019. Three dec-
ades have passed since the adoption of the “Christmas Constitution” on 
December 22, 1990, when the fundamental legal and political document 
of the Republic of Croatia underwent six major changes. The country 
abandoned the one-party system and the socialist model of the economy 
and accepted the multiparty system and private capitalism; it chose the 
political system, the electoral system, and checks and balances institu-
tions, which inevitably had a crucial influence on the results of the transi-
tion process. By analysing the legal and political process of transition and 
transformation of politics and the economy, the paper tries to establish 
the relation between the choice of the form of government and the elec-
toral system with the results of political system management in the real-
ity of European and global integration. It tries to demonstrate whether 
the chosen initial political institutions (political architecture and electoral 
system) were in line with the community’s perspective and social image. 
Three decades are sufficient time to judge the selected political package 
and its overall social outcome.
The author briefly analyses the transfer of the initial body of law pertain-
ing to the political system, the economy, and society from the former 
Yugoslavia to the Republic of Croatia. Each of these three variables/val-
ues developed its own institutions in the recent past. Each of them had 
a different level of independence or their actions had some democratic 
elements. None of the institutions was without democratic elements; on 
the contrary, democratic elements were implicitly or explicitly contained 
in legal acts of these institutions. Another, and perhaps more important 
characteristic, was the establishment of a unique economic model of gov-
ernance – ’self-management‘ or social capitalism – which was completely 
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different from the two established economic models: state capitalism in 
the East and private capitalism in the West (Horvat, 1983).
Replacing a non-democratic socialist system with democracy and market 
economy models required a better understanding of the fragile balance 
between market and governance and the need to establish a functional 
and strong state1 in terms of a clearly chosen institutional framework. The 
success of the market economy and democracy is related to successful 
government. It is also well known that economic progress can be achieved 
through various combinations of institutional frameworks, depending on 
the values  and needs of a particular nation (Stiglitz, 2004; Rodrik, 2011). 
Preferences in institutional design, legal culture, and volume of regulation 
or sociological image of society lead to very different choices and various 
combinations of political governance and market organization and ulti-
mately to their different results (Stephens, 1995; Lijphart, 2012).
The second section explains the methodology used for analysing the terms 
used in the paper, which make up the essence of an institutional combi-
nation. The terms that we consider in the context of transition and trans-
formation include freedom, democracy, transition, transformation, capi-
talism, the rule of law, good governance, participation, and institutions. 
Their original meaning is rather broad, while their content is indisputably 
related to the legal culture and the society they come from. The content 
of terms at the beginning of the Croatian transition and transformation 
process (T / T) is comparable with selected definitions. The third section 
describes the beginning of transition. Namely, both transition and trans-
formation had their start date. There had already been the Croatian state 
– the people, the political, the economic and the legal system, the inter-
est groups, the civic associations, the private property. Thus, there was 
life and culture covered by the legal system at the beginning. The fourth 
section presents the three phases of the transition-transformation pro-
cess through the prism of changes of the fundamental legal and political 
document and specific social phenomena of that period. The conclusion 
summarizes the findings, focusing on the characteristics of society and 
the results of the model of political management during the process of 
transition and transformation.
1 In this context functional and strong state implies functioning of institutions based 
on clear rules and responsibilities The functional state (the rule of law) can produce results 
when it is rooted in people’s behaviour and attitudes. 
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2.  Methodology and explanation of terms 
This section deals with definitions and content explanations for select-
ed terms. The next section gives an overview of the scope these terms 
had at the beginning of the process of transition and transformation of 
Croatian society. An analysis of the main changes of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia follows, together with some characteristic social 
phenomena in each of the analysed periods and their implications on the 
overall social development. By comparing the initial position and achieve-
ments after three decades of transition, the performance results are eval-
uated in comparison to the results of other countries.
2.1  Definitions and content of the selected terms
Institution. “Institutions are the rules of conduct in a particular society or 
more formally the limitations that man has deployed to shape human in-
teractions” (North, 2003, p. 13). As the term of institution narrows down, 
the definitions of institutions differ from author to author and the society 
in which they live. What all definitions have in common is the “behaviour-
al rules”. In other words, institutions are the consequence of certain legal 
culture of society (Pusić, 1989; Čepulo, 2001).
Freedom. Greek word freedom originally signifies legal-political freedom 
– a free city that is not under foreign rule (Coreth, 1998, p. 392). “Man 
is free if his action is directed towards good, which is truly the supreme 
purpose; it exists for its own sake and expresses the essence of freedom. 
The state is a mediator between man and the good”. A newer view of free-
dom (for individuals), the contemporary understanding of liberty (insti-
tutional), particularly in liberal and neoliberal concepts, starts from the 
absolute and unconditional freedom of the individual, which at the same 
time implies his complete responsibility for what he has done without the 
possibility of calling to collective responsibility. Freedom can be treat-
ed as a social value (Sen, 2012) or as an individual choice of a rational 
individual. However, looking at individualism and community, they are 
equally opposed to public good and private property, though both require 
responsible management. Consequently, the priorities of a rational indi-
vidual and community priorities have different hierarchies and durability 
(Ostrom, 2006). Nevertheless, the growth in inequality rates, as a result 
of competition, leads people to helplessness in which every freedom be-
comes pointless (Sen, 2012; Pinker, 2018).
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Democracy. One of the most widely used definitions is the one by A. Lin-
coln: “Democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for 
the people”. It is common to define democracy as a form of government 
in which the supreme authority (sovereignty) is in the hands of the peo-
ple, and it is realized directly or through representatives chosen in free 
elections. This type of democracy is characterised by majority rule and 
corrected by guaranteed of human rights. Modern democracy can thus 
be defined as constitutional democracy, which implies majority rule with 
the rule of law and a full guarantee of the rights of individuals and minor-
ities. Although it seems that access to democracy should follow the law, it 
would be wise to consider democracy as a way of life – to live democracy, 
because democracy is the optimal form of government for achieving the 
greatest ‘happiness’ for most individuals (Lauc, 1998, p. 139; Dahl, 1999). 
Pluralistic society is divided not only politically but also religiously, linguis-
tically, culturally, and ethnically. There are also clefts in the economy (more 
or less developed); structure (agriculture and industry); legal culture (east 
and west) and identity (south and north). In other words, there is an imme-
diate nexus between the choice of a democratic model and the degree of 
pluralism in a society. Political acceptance of democracy through elections 
is the first step towards identification with democracy and development. 
However, “it is not enough ... just to create a new institutional machine; the 
society has to be transformed first. It is also the duty of the government to 
create a common social will as the basis for a government which will rep-
resent the people in their entirety ... Change of society is a prerequisite for 
change of form of government” (Lijphart, 1992, pp. 30-31).
Rule of law. The concept of the rule of law means a system of political au-
thority based on the respect of constitution, laws, and other regulations, 
by both citizens and the state authorities. The concept of the rule of law 
is not limited to formal respect of the principle of constitutionality and 
legality but requires the constitution and laws to have certain content, 
appropriate to a democratic system, so that they enable the protection 
of human rights and freedoms in relations between citizens and public 
authorities. Geographically, Croatian society is made up of six historically 
different legal-political systems (Čepulo, 2012), which do not understand 
or interpret the principle of the rule of law in the same way. When five 
decades of a unique system of self-managing socialism is added to the 
mixture, we get a unique collage of understanding the rule of law.2 
2 “The new socialist government insisted to overcome the past and “turn to the fu-
ture”. New policies were led under the slogan that Josip Broz Tito himself gave in his first 
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Capitalism. The greatest number of analysts interpret capitalism as an 
economic system that, in its various manifestations, has special political 
and social features. In their view, capital is not a set of things, but primar-
ily a set of social relations. It is expressed in the belief that the existing in-
equalities of income and wealth are an objective and justified outcome of 
various contributions that people give to economic activity. This implies 
that for the permanent benefit of a capitalist society certain freedoms and 
rights are indispensable. However, individuals must be protected from 
arbitrary state authority, and the state protects their economic interests 
by protecting their property rights and guaranteeing the implementation 
of trade agreements (Ferenčak, 2002). Capitalism has an inherent ine-
quality, and because of that very reason there are several varieties of per-
formance of the capitalist system, particularly on the European continent: 
from coordinated capitalism in Germany to hybrid capitalism in Scandi-
navian countries, as opposed to British economic liberalism – neoliberal 
capitalism (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007).
Good governance. As with previous concepts, there are different definitions 
of good governance depending on who uses the concept and for what 
purpose (IMF, WB, EC, etc.). A new definition of good governance has 
been created in the EU. The doctrine of good governance emerged at the 
turn of the 2000s, as a product of criticism of the very influential doctrine 
of new public management. The new public management has blurred the 
lines of political responsibility, reduced transparency, spurred corruption, 
reduced public spending, neglected citizens’ rights, intensified regulatory 
activity in the state, and had other poor effects. The European Union 
has established the following principles of good governance: openness, 
citizen participation, responsibility, efficiency, and coherence. The first 
three principles promote democratic governance and the restoration of 
the democratic political legitimacy of modern states. Effectiveness and 
speech in liberated Zagreb, on 21 May 1945: ‘Enough with everything that once was!’ Yu-
goslavia was only possible as ‘New Yugoslavia’, which would be radically (revolutionary) 
different from the previous “Old”, royal Yugoslavia. The monarchy was replaced with a re-
public in 1945, a unitary country was replaced with a federation, a country that built the 
Yugoslav nation was replaced by a community of nations whose existence and development 
was guaranteed by the state. A country in which religious divisions had been encouraged 
was replaced by one actively suppressing the influence of clergy and religious organizations. 
A country whose political system had been based on party pluralism, was replaced by one 
that decided to eliminate ‘party-brawlers’, and set up a single – communist – party as the 
political hegemon. Instead of aspects of tradition around which there was dispute among the 
peoples, the Socialist Yugoslavia sought to reinterpret the past in a way that would make it 
less controversial” (Jović, 2008, p. 108).
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coherence should enable efficient governance and institutional capacity 
building of European countries (Koprić, 2009, p. 71).
Self-Government became an important concept in Croatia in the beginning 
of the process of accession to the European Union. Local and regional 
self-government in Croatia was revived after the year 2000 and brought 
institutional changes (Koprić, 2013). The European Charter of Local 
Self-Government (ECLSG) had long been awaiting a debate in Croatian 
Parliament before it was partially adopted in 1997 and fully in 2008. While 
it was a federal state of the Socialist Yugoslavia, Croatia was a heavily de-
centralized country, with large and strong local self-government units that 
had 40 per cent share in the total state income. Decentralization was both 
political and financial: local authorities decided on all the key communi-
ty needs and problems; they could levy certain taxes and had tricameral 
assemblies as a model of protection of the widest possible interests. The 
difference between self-government then and now is huge. 
Participation. Here we are talking about political participation (engage-
ment and action). “The concept of political inclusion encompasses politi-
cal interests and policy talks, and the term political participation includes 
all activities by which citizens can influence political processes”. In pursuit 
of a realistic approach to democracy, R. Dahl understood democracy as 
effective political participation, involvement of all adults in the political 
process, equality in voting, citizen understanding of political issues and 
control over politics (Dahl, 1999). If political and civic participation is 
important for the health of democracy, we can talk about the necessity of 
establishing participative democracy instead of elitist or formal-represent-
ative democracy (Ravlić, 2007). 
The concept of participation – involvement and action, and even of par-
ticipatory management – may be interpreted in Article 122 of the Con-
stitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia: “The working class and all 
working people exercise power and manage other social affairs organized 
in organizations of associated labour, other self-managing organizations 
and communities, as well as class and other socio-political and social or-
ganizations”. There is also Article 127: “The management of organizations 
of associated labour, territorial communities, self-managing interest com-
munities and other self-managing organizations and communities, and 
their organization shall be arranged so that working people in every part 
of the work process and in every organization or community decide on 
the issues of their work and other interests, exercise their self-governing 
rights and common interests, and control the implementation of decisions 
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and the work of all bodies and services of organizations and communities 
thereof”.
Transition. The transition of political systems is the interval between two 
regimes. Transition does not refer to the outcome, only to the span; it does 
not even talk about transition paths. Like any other term, the concept of 
transition has different explanations in the literature. O’Donell, Schmitter 
and Whitehead (1986) offer a useful definition: “Transitions are limited, 
first to launching the process of solving an authoritarian regime and, sec-
ondly, by installing some form of democracy, return to some form of au-
thoritarian government, or the emergence of revolutionary alternatives”. 
Mainwaring does not agree with their discussion on the concept of tran-
sition and arguments that no matter what “scope exists in any effective 
authority and procedures, it tends be in the hands of authoritarian rul-
ers” (Mainwaring, 1989). Thus, one could conclude that if the outcome 
is satisfactory, the country in question has made the right choice of the 
transition process!
Transformation. Transformation of a society implies a thorough change of 
the political regime, social order, and the economic system, with its an-
alytical perspective focused on politics (Merkel, 2011). The sources of 
transformation are real-life conflicts of interest: centre – periphery, state 
– church, capital – work, individual – community and public good – prof-
it. Five opposing values  set a permanent framework for party systems of 
European democratic states. The political parties of Western Europe are 
a product of conflicts and certain permanent splits that have stabilized 
and constellated interests and society. Changes in political actions of the 
parties began at the end of the Golden Age and the beginning of globaliza-
tion of the economy. Political parties became central institutions of civil 
society and modern democracy when they were accepted as legitimate 
mediators between society (citizens) and the state. However, J. S. Mill 
has already identified one of the key negative sides of the concept of po-
litical governance associated with political parties, “…neglecting political 
principles and transforming everything into the interests of the party, con-
nection with monopolization of processes, the choice of persons, which 
puts rational arguments in a subordinate position in relation to the inter-
ests of the party” (Ravlić, 2007, p. 983).
The term transformation represented a specific type of social change that 
should be understood as an alternative way of (formal) change compara-
ble to classical formation of modern democratic and capitalist societies 
over more than three centuries. In order to be accepted and successfully 
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performed, transformation has to express general terms through real life 
values. Freedom, independence, market economy and democracy, con-
ceptual and comparative, should have their values  and role model. Trans-
formation is the key cause of social cleavage between the Croatian society 
and its political elite. After thirty years of transition in Croatia, the polit-
ical elite and political parties have not yet completed their own transition 
to democratic political institutions.
The decision on transition from a single party system to a multi-party sys-
tem was made by the socialist Parliament, led by the Communist Party. 
The political transition in Croatia ended with the first multi-party election 
in April 1990 and the constitution of a multi-party parliament. Croatia 
formally became a democratic country. People expected and public opin-
ion supported the introduction of the pluralist political system. Defini-
tions are here to point out the formal value of institutions. For a long-
time, the world has recognized and understood the fundamental political 
dilemma: can we simultaneously deal with democracy, national decisions, 
and economic globalization, and in the case of Croatia, with the Europe-
an integration process? We cannot. Croatia could not. We had to make a 
choice.
All of the terms have certain values  and reflect quite different expecta-
tions, which should be equally considered. The differences in cultural tra-
ditions are visible between European countries and other regions as well 
as in relation to the heritage of political culture (Lijphart, 2012). Howev-
er, values  cannot be attributed or prescribed; they cannot be adopted by 
ordinance or recommendation because people and values had existed and 
inherited different legal cultures and lifestyles before transitions began. It 
is the people that are different, and these differences are inevitably evi-
dent in the content of institutions.
3. “In the beginning was ...”
This section provides a brief overview of real social values  of the Croatian 
society at the beginning of the process of transition and transformation 
in the 1990s.
Institutions. The entire population had access to public education and 
health care. Social care, general security and job security in Croatia were 
often mentioned as highly successful and well-organized. The health care 
model was frequently analysed and even copied. Education was free of 
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charge. There were social funds for gifted individuals as well as institu-
tional assessment preferences and professional orientation procedures for 
discovering talents. Social care, social assistance and housing assistance 
were a constituent content of social policies at the national level, but also 
a compulsory part of business policies of each socialist enterprise. There 
were high levels of trust, solidarity and assistance in society, especially 
within local communities. Social organization was based on large local 
self-management units with developed industry as a base for jobs and 
community expansion. Company business plans had compulsory plans 
for increasing the number of jobs for each subsequent year (co-ordinated 
society).
Freedom. Freedom in a society which is the owner and manager of social 
property had a completely different reflection of economic freedoms than 
the West preferred and advocated. The progress of society and increased 
standard of living since the mid-1970s was more apparent in reality than 
in statistics. With a Yugoslav passport one could travel wherever one want-
ed to. Skiing or shopping in Austria or Italy was quite common. Working 
hours were tailored according to the features of the community. Namely, 
the majority of employees in industry and public administration had ad-
ditional income from second jobs or family farms where they produced 
and sold their products individually or in organized co-operation with the 
public sector. Almost every company had special funds to assist its em-
ployees, and each trade union had or organized vacations for workers. We 
can talk about political freedoms through legal regulation. There was only 
one political party. However, after the 1974 amendments to the Constitu-
tion, there was legal possibility of political competition (former President 
of the Republic of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić became an independent repre-
sentative in the parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia). Another 
form of political freedom was rendered possible through the other two 
political institutions, chambers of associated labour and the Socialist Al-
liance. The former represented the interests of workers and the business 
sector in Parliament and in municipal assemblies. The latter engaged the 
whole population politically (all the inhabitants were members of the So-
cialist Alliance). We are not talking about the performance of any part of 
the mentioned political freedom, but about legal possibilities. The right 
to strike and referendum were also institutionalized. Judicial disputes be-
tween workers and employers were not uncommon and lasted for a long 
time. Religious affiliation was a personal matter of every individual. 
Rule of law. Socialist Croatia had a tripartite government. It had a tri-
cameral parliament, the executive branch, and judiciary and judicial over-
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sight. Justice was organized on a functional basis (commercial courts, civil 
courts, labour courts, and administrative courts). As an inheritor of the 
concept of administrative legislation of the Habsburg Monarchy, Croatia 
had one of the best, perhaps even the best Administrative Procedure Act 
in Europe. Furthermore, the concept of the French Revolution – equali-
ty, fraternity and unity – was heavily embedded in the institutions of the 
federal state and those of the republics. Those values  were accompanied 
by the rule of law and a strong legality culture. Today’s Croatian political 
elite perceives the rule of law as part of the EU conditionality policy and 
not as part of the national tradition. Thus, a coherent system is not a rou-
tine, nor a transfer from another system, nor a set of comprehensive rules 
that solve all problems – it is a milieu in which people and society accept 
these rules or not (Hesselink, 2001).
Unfortunately, in such a copy-paste transformation, individuals could not 
see themselves as citizens whose freedom encompasses the possibility of 
not doing whatever is outside of their interests and wishes. It was obvious 
– and it still is – that freedom was understood as a space in which every-
one can to do whatever they want. If it is so, and evidence shows it is, the 
rule of law has remained only a formal constitutional category. We had 
the rule of law before! We formally have elections, but it is a simplistic 
democracy instead of democratic governance. We had elections before!
Capitalism. At the time, Yugoslavia was rather different from the two 
dominant types of capitalism: western and eastern. Yugoslavia chose 
a third way, an experimental type of capitalism for which there was no 
pattern, self-managed social capitalism. Social capitalism did not deny 
ownership, but social property was the property of society. Social capi-
talism, as well as any other system, required the establishment of mar-
ket and management institutions. There are several key institutions that 
are clearly marked by social capitalism. The first and most important 
was participation. All bodies in self-governing organizations had mem-
bers and the choice of the quality people important for the functioning of 
self-management institutions resulted in better or worse management of 
the enterprise. The second was the distribution of profit for technological 
development, strengthening of human resources, or social solidarity. The 
third value was socially responsible business. Civil society, as we now call 
the space between the private and the public, could not exist without the 
financial and other support of self-management business organizations. 
Sports and recreation, cultural events and cultural societies, long-term 
assistance to cultural and educational institutions, as well as allocations 
for communal infrastructure, were an integral part of companies’ business 
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plans. However, the growth of profit was not imperative. The concept of 
political economy set a goal of high employment rate, but it was limited 
by the increase in pays and productivity. Because of that, additional eco-
nomic activities and second jobs were quite common, and the authorities 
widely tolerated them. The socialist self-management economic system 
was constitutionally regulated – social enterprises could make co-opera-
tion agreements with private organizations or among themselves. Private 
property and private entities also existed (Horvat, 1983). 
Socialist transformation of the society was conducted in the four and a 
half decades following WW II. The pursuit of “proper socialism” supposed 
that constitutional changes and experimental solutions could substitute 
the abandonment of democracy and market economy by the development 
of workers’ self-management at all social levels. In other words, transfor-
mation via socialist reforms encompassed the market, working democ-
racy, social ownership, self-management, and indicative planning – the 
same institutions as in western and eastern capitalism, but with different 
goals. Regardless of the single-party regime, the reforms were carried out 
with difficulties and strong resistance in the less developed federal units. 
However, despite all contradictions, the success of socialist reforms in Yu-
goslavia was evident – Yugoslavia was one of the ten newly industrialized 
countries in the world. Croatia reached a similar degree of development 
two decades later, in the 21st century (Horvat, 1983; Stipetić, 2012; Vo-
jnović, 2013, p. 153). 
The transfer of the socialist economy towards private capitalism began 
before the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia. It seems that Croatia today, 
thirty years later, is still faced with the same political problems which are 
a far bigger burden than economic problems. At the end of the 1980s, it 
was quite clear that the transition could not be carried out without plural-
ism in all three key areas of social interaction (market, property, and po-
litical concept). Thus, transition could not succeed if transformation does 
not conduct in all three areas. As it is well known, the attempt to build 
“new socialism” failed (Vojnić, 1989). Pursuant to this experience, it is 
worth pointing out that the process of transformation must be coherent, 
systematic, and controlled. 
The western transition access to the democracy of communist countries 
of Eastern Europe was like replacing the door plaque – the old one was 
switched with the new one. However, behind the door there was a socie-
ty with its cultural, political and economic heritage, extremely pluralistic 
and heterogeneous with a different attitude towards the state and the 
rule of law (Jović, 2008; Tomić-Koludrović & Petrić, 2005). Ignoring this 
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fact meant giving a wrong diagnosis and setting a wrong strategy of the 
T / T project in Croatia. Professor of constitutional law, Branko Smerdel 
(2019) summarizes it, “when we sum it up after thirty years, we can see 
that the project of democratic Croatia has failed”. In other words, the only 
remaining things from transition to a democratic state were multi-party 
elections and the possibility of the change of government. The “constitu-
tional revolution” that started the transition in Croatia remained only on 
the formal level of the adopted aplenty of regulations we cite as success 
(Berman, 1983, p. 44). There is an abundance of law but little justice. 
Although the institutions, the market, and democracy were in the centre 
of transition and transformation, their legal aspect cannot be evaluated 
without evaluating the former Federation, of which Croatia was a mem-
ber. The development of those institutions had different paths and dif-
ferent outcomes, and in terms of social rights diametrically opposing fea-
tures. The pendulum of solidarity in a democratic society, as the key value 
of the welfare society, does not always have to be on one side, depending 
on the political actors of the winning party or coalition. Mihaljević (2011) 
summarizes the former regime’s approach, “democracy, freedom and the 
protection of rights were only nominal because, while internationally pro-
claimed, internal constitutional law plans avoided taking over internation-
al obligations” (p. 50).
4.  Legal-political performance of the process of 
transition and transformation 
The process of transition and transformation in Croatia was not com-
pletely independent because it did not happen entirely under the man-
tle of internal actors. It was a common effort of domestic and foreign 
actors with different legitimacy: domestic actors had the legitimacy to 
accommodate external reform solutions, while foreigners in turn provided 
support to local actors (Mueller, 1996, pp. 141-143). To be free, to be 
successful, modern, contemporary, meant to follow the same path, the 
same experience, almost unconditionally adapt to suggested or imposed 
external institutional solutions in all areas of life – to become other people 
was the task. However, the proposed institutional solutions with regard 
to the type of democracy, capitalism, political system and the experience 
of presenters, were not discussed, although the outcomes were quite dif-
ferent from one democratic country to another – under the same terms 
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– beginning with the basic legal and political document, the Constitution 
(Posavec, 2000). The past three decades of transition and transformation 
process in Croatia can be divided into three main periods of ten years, 
three stages of changes.
4.1  First stage – The Christmas Constitution of 1990 and 
afterwards
The process of democratic change in Croatia was not the outcome of na-
tional pressure, there were no mass demonstrations or other type of mass 
political protest. The National Movement had emerged as a support to po-
litical reforms and the crisis of the state. Therefore, the old political elite 
had the key political influence on the creation of democratic political insti-
tutions. The two strongest political parties had a similar stance towards the 
choice of the electoral system and the model of government. The majority 
electoral system and parliamentary government were proposed by reformed 
communists, while the strongest opposition parties advocated for parlia-
mentary government and the proportional electoral system. However, after 
the elections were carried out, the new elite institutionalized the semi-presi-
dential system, “presidential parliamentarism”, and the segmented electoral 
model (Kasapović, 1996, pp. 94-96). According to the established institu-
tional preferences, the new political elite in Croatia was similar to the old or 
reformed elites in Eastern European countries (Szelenyi & Szeleny, 1995). 
Given the way of making institutional solutions, experience shows that 
the majority electoral system in principle causes instability in the political 
system and leads to fundamental changes at each change of government. 
Thus, at the very beginning of the new institutional endeavour there was no 
attempt to gather political actors and use evidence-based design of political 
institutions, despite the window of opportunity. 
The legal aspect of transition and transformation process is evident in the 
structure of Croatian Constitution. Its preamble titled Historical Foun-
dations had practically the same preamble as the 1974 Constitution of 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The Christmas Constitution continued 
with the legal practice of defining classical liberal democratic institutions, 
nationality, and citizens (Štiks, 2016). Defining the nationality and citi-
zenship, the use of public services and the voting right opened an area for 
political manipulation afterwards. As a result, at one point, Croatia had 
a few hundred thousand voters more than the total population. The Cro-
atian Constitution could be perceived as a programmatic political doc-
663























ument (Smerdel, 2013), unlike others, which are seen as legal-political 
acts. Thus, while the others open the competition space within a defined 
framework, Croatian political elite tends to cement the state (Smerdel, 
2009, p.105).3 The second feature was the prominent multiculturalism 
that rests on the history of Croatian statehood in the preamble of the 
Christmas Constitution. However, the Croatian society was and still is 
divided by cultural differences and cleavages (geographical, ethnic, na-
tional, ideological, religious), producing a non-viable democratic society. 
Three decades after the adoption of the Christmas Constitution, Croatia 
has fewer than four million inhabitants, i.e. it has almost one million fewer 
inhabitants and the divisions within society have never been greater.
The legal specificity of social ownership influenced the model of privatiza-
tion launched in the former Federation. The Federation adopted a privat-
ization model in which the state conducted the assessment and controlled 
the value of a business entity as well as the sources of funding. The new 
political power rejected the socialist model of privatization and accepted 
its own programme called the Conversion and Privatization Programme. 
The new programme was created and implemented far from the public 
eyes. The process was finally completed by a constitutional provision stip-
ulating that “crime and robbery in the process of conversion and privatiza-
tion have no statute of limitations”. After that, nothing happened. 
The third feature of the first stage of democratic transition is an impor-
tant empirical fact of civil society development. In the socialist society 
the freedom of association was limited and directed. However, in the new 
circumstances, the inherited passive attitude of citizens showed its neg-
ative side. The reformed Communists understood very well what it takes 
to create favourable conditions for the development of civil society in a 
democratic environment, but in reality they claimed that the Red Cross 
and Caritas were quite sufficient civil society organizations (Bežovan & 
Matančević, 2017, p. 33).
4.2  The second stage – The constitutional amendments of 
2000 and beyond
The 1990 Constitution affirmed Croatia’s sovereignty and independence; 
the preamble emphasized the multicultural value of the state. The ques-
3 In October 1995, President of the Croatian Parliament proposed to declare Franjo 
Tuđman lifelong President by amending the Constitution. 
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tion is whether the Constitution ensured the achievement of these values 
and their legitimacy; whether the constitutional principles found their 
place in the adopted regulations or they remained formal recordings. The 
preambles of other constitutions strongly determine (e.g. the foundations 
of the United States, Germany or Japan) the aspirations of the founders, 
i.e. the very essence of the endeavour (Bačić, 2012).
The constitutional amendments of 2000 happened in the wake of the first 
change of government and election of a new President. The then elected 
political coalition changed the Constitution by introducing a parliamen-
tary instead of a semi-presidential system. However, the concept of par-
liamentary system was not clearly defined. Less than six months later, in 
March 2001, the Constitution was changed again in order to abolish the 
House of Counties and finally introduce a unicameral parliament. The op-
position (in power until 3 January 2000) accepted the idea of  a weak Pres-
ident of the Republic, understanding the constitutional model of state 
organization as an adjustment of the ideas and personality of the current 
leader. Of course, the ideas concerning the position and powers of the 
President did not disappear from the agenda; they were merely postponed 
until the next presidential election. It was, and still is, is a topical issue at 
both sides of the political spectrum (Smerdel, 2010, pp. 8-9). However, 
the understanding of legitimacy of constitutional values  among political 
elites was brought down to cutting out the Constitution in accordance 
with the currently available capacities of the ruling coalition. It is quite 
clear that such an approach to constitutional design and the realization 
of constitutional values  is rather different from the values and principles 
embodied in the Constitution itself. After two decades, it became much 
clearer to everyone that Croatian society is a pluralistic and heterogene-
ous society, whose values  are inevitably in constant mutual conflict more 
than before (Tomić-Koludrović & Petrić, 2005). Changing the Constitu-
tion in the circumstances of the change of government, instead trying to 
achieve social goals, shows a selective approach to building a fundamental 
legal-political document, mostly oriented towards party interests.
The 2010 amendments to the Constitution of 2010 established a valid 
constitutional basis for the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the 
European Union, and introduced other provisions necessary for the effec-
tive functioning of the country within the EU. There were two groups of 
important changes that were not adequately discussed: (1) constitutional 
issues arising from certain EU negotiation chapters – independence of the 
Croatian National Bank and the State Audit Office; active and passive 
voting rights of EU citizens residing in the Republic of Croatia; strength-
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ening the independence, impartiality, and professionalism of the judici-
ary; effective implementation of the EU Council Framework Decision 
on a European Arrest Warrant, and (2) constitutional issues that were 
not directly related to negotiation chapters but to the modalities of the 
accession and functioning of the Republic of Croatia within the European 
Union – constitutional basis for the EU accession; referendum on Croa-
tia’s EU membership; transfer of constitutional powers, participation in 
EU institutions, direct effect and application of EU law, relationship be-
tween legislative; the executive and the judiciary after EU membership 
and EU citizenship in the Republic of Croatia, and securing their rights 
etc. (Bačić, 2011, p. 159). The first group makes a substantive package 
of changes that directly concern the fundamental legal document and its 
status with respect to the Accession Agreement. Independence of some 
institutions speaks little about the essence of these changes or about the 
position of the Constitutional Court in relation to EU legislation. For 
example, the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany 
has the right and obligation to establish the conformity of certain treaties 
or EU regulations with German constitutional provisions. Furthermore, 
there are different degrees of institutional independence and institutions 
differ from one EU member to another. The second issue is related to 
sovereignty and the scope of options state has at its disposal when there 
are cases of particular national interest. It should be the most important 
political issue for all political parties.
The amendments to the Constitution were largely conditioned by the pro-
cess of Croatia’s accession to the European Union. One-time mitigation 
of the criterion of legitimacy of the referendum on the issue of EU acces-
sion clearly shows the political position of domestic political elite on the 
importance of direct democracy as well as the faith in their own project. 
The regulation of referendum casts light on childhood illnesses of Croa-
tian democracy, first and foremost on the issue of the imprecise number 
of voters. For twenty years, Croatia had several hundred thousand regis-
tered voters more than the total population and conducted all elections 
under these circumstances.
Some changes of the Constitution were motivated by purely domestic 
considerations. The most controversial was an amendment to the Con-
stitution which prevented the statute of limitations for war crimes and 
crimes connected with  war profiteering and privatization. The amend-
ments to the Constitution should have been followed by enacting per-
formance regulations and establishment of executive bodies that would 
impose sanctions in the following period (with a deadline). This was a 
666





particularly interesting topic given the direct and clear requirement of 
international factors to adopt a national anti-corruption plan. The most 
impressionable indicators of good governance – the rule of law and con-
trol of corruption – kept the same performance level from 2004 to 2013, 
according to Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 55 and 60 percent, 
respectively, cf. Galović, 2015, p. 109). In 2017, corruption control kept 
the same level, while the rule of law was better for ten percentage points 
(WBG 2019). The WGI 2018 Corruption Indicator provides the best de-
scription of social relations that cover the concept of corruption in Croa-
tia. In that sense, the constitutional provisions that prevent the statute of 
limitations are entirely formal.
4.3  The third stage – The period of integration and popular 
referenda initiatives
The third stage of development was characterized by popular referenda 
initiatives. The first constitutional initiative of 2014, as well as the latter 
ones, demonstrated the use of referendum as a national instrument in 
democratic processes outside the political elite with a highly effective civic 
influence, but also indicated the necessity of providing clear legal regula-
tion of direct democracy. Đorđe Gardašević (2016) discusses the referen-
dum as a democratic tool with the aim of pointing out at an important 
practical problem of constitutional regulation of referendum. Gardašević 
notes that the majority of recent popular initiatives focus on two areas of 
citizens’ interest – economy and ideology. The first reflects dissatisfaction 
with the government’s economic and social policies, and the second a de-
sire to reconstruct the model of representative rule. In fact, these two are 
interconnected, which was confirmed when more than 600,000 signatures 
against the adopted pension reform were collected in May 2019.4
Another important feature was the constitutional crisis caused by failed 
election of the Constitutional Court judges. In 2016, the Croatian Par-
liament was steadfast in its attempt to elect new judges of the Constitu-
tional Court, which threatened to block the work of the key supervisory 
institution. In addition, some questioned the purpose of the Constitu-
tional Court (Gardašević, 2016; Smerdel, 2016). Thus, after thirty years 



























of the independent state, the election Constitutional Court judges and 
the very purpose of the Constitutional Court have become a matter of 
political competition instead of the key responsibility of the political elite 
that should ensure normal functioning of the state by electing profession-
al, experienced and respected candidates as Constitutional Court judges 
(Antić, 2015). 
The legislative process is dominated by two forms of legislature which are 
not clearly based on the Constitution: the adoption of bills aimed at har-
monisation with EU law and the adoption of laws in an urgent procedure. 
Both forms point at urgency for which there should be, according to the 
Constitution, truly solid arguments or special circumstances (war, natural 
disasters, pandemics, etc.). However, most of the urgently adopted legis-
lation is related to harmonisation with EU law. Between 1990 and 2019, 
Croatian Parliament adopted 5,150 laws the vast majority of which were 
amended or amended several times during the same calendar year.5 These 
data show that speed is not a virtue, and that quantity does not necessarily 
mean quality work. Overall indicators verify this assertion. 
The country that has been swallowed up by a single party, political parties 
ruled by party chieftains, single-candidate party elections, competition as 
a waste of energy – these are the characteristics of the political scene in 
Croatia. Consequently, the governments’ results are the product of these 
characteristics. Croatia ranks 25th by per capita GDP out of 28 EU coun-
tries, 29th out of 46 European countries and 60th out of 133 countries in 
the world.6 According to the prosperity index, Croatia is 25th out of 28 
EU member states and 41st out 149 evaluated countries. However, the 
ranking in other two areas confirms the author’s findings: 104th ranking in 
business climate and 109th in social capital out of 149 countries evaluated. 
It is worth pointing out that citizens hold less favourable opinions about 
some indexes than the rankings show – Croatia is 15th in environmental 
protection, 33rd in security, and 34th in education. Two related areas, econ-
omy and management, occupy 64th and 55th place, respectively.7 Compar-
ative indicators of the country,8 the loss of population and the abundant 
5 Available at https://www.nn.hr/ 
6 Available at http://statisticstimes.com/economy/european-countries-by-gdp-per-capita.
php
7  Available at https://www.prosperity.com/rankings 
8 Available at https://www.imd.org/wcc/world-competitiveness-center-rankings/world-
competitiveness-ranking-2019 
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transfers of central government grants, maintain a relatively inert society, 
unwilling to make a progressive step and indifferent to regressive ten-
dencies. Emigration of young people to other EU countries has further 
emphasized social indifference, even nihilism towards the current state 
of Croatian society and dominant social phenomena. The stratification 
of society is visible not only at the economic level but also at the general 
level of understanding the political processes. In such a stratified society, 
it is difficult or even impossible to expect a sudden change in the political 
paradigm. 
It is obvious that transition reached its limits a long time ago, and the 
sole reliance on foreign direct investment or funds is insufficient for faster 
economic development. To accelerate the economic growth and catch 
up with the developed EU countries, it is necessary to pursuit our own 
development strategy based on Croatia’s own resources and comparative 
advantages (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). Therefore, the power of the 
state must be clearly distinguished from its ability to make transparent 
plans and enforce political decisions. However, the inadequate domes-
tic demand for institutional reforms, as opposed to the external one, is 
the main obstacle to creating development strategies without external in-
fluences. It should be emphasized that state-building skills remain a key 
component of nation power and vice versa, regardless of the degree of 
integration (Fukuyama, 2005).
Croatia successfully fulfilled the conditions for the transfer of EU law 
to the Croatian legal system during the EU accession process. It also 
successfully transfers EU regulations as a member state. The power of 
transposed European law as an educational instrument has not proven to 
be particularly advantageous in the case of Croatia. The majority of social 
and political actors have shown readiness to formally accept new legal 
rules, unwillingness to act upon them, and reluctance to adapt policies 
based on analyses. These are the key issues of Croatian transformation. 
The only two important political issues in the public debate have been the 
referenda on the country independence and the EU accession. There has 
been little or no public debate about the transformation models appro-
priate for other social or economic institutions. The political elite did not 
create conditions for fair debate about the models of institutional trans-
formation and their consequences for society, nor it made comparisons 
with transformation models and their consequences in other countries. 
For example, how to build up a welfare state of Danish type? What was 
quite noticeable was the growth in the number of supermarkets and the 
selection of goods on their shelves. The internal public debt and citizens’ 
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debt problems have grown along with the growth of public spending – it 
is called super-market democracy. We have lost the citizen among the 
supermarket shelves. Do we have a society at all?
5. Conclusion
Changes of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia were of a project 
nature, more focused on the political elite in power than on the substan-
tive permanent changes of the political system goals. They enabled the 
superiority of the political elite over other political actors and citizens. 
These changes did not significantly affect the model of political govern-
ance in the country. The well-known socialist model – the state = the party 
– continued to be used by all actors in a new, democratic environment. 
Being part of the political elite in power has secured many privileges. 
Consequently, the state continued to grow and build procedures to sat-
isfy the appetites of its political controllers. The central government has 
become a key player deciding on the development of a particular region 
or municipality. Because of that, it is very important from where members 
of political elite have been recruited. Political party verticals have enabled 
the accumulation of political and public positions.
Croatian society has never been so divided geographically, regionally, po-
litically, ideologically, ethnically, and religiously. The ghosts of the past 
have risen. The main daily policy themes show that the project of omni 
Croatan reconciliation has failed not for lack of good intentions, but be-
cause of antinomy. Moreover, the increase in inequality, insecurity, inef-
fective rule of law, and irresponsiveness has resulted in population loss, 
further enhancing the antinomy. The achievement of political freedoms 
and the registration of more than 160 political parties say more about the 
deep cleavage in the society than about its freedoms. The dichotomy of 
Croatian readiness to integrate and inability to manage its own develop-
ment is still burdening Croatian citizens. 
The development of the economy has not reached the expected level, 
given the potential Croatia had in industrial capacities and people. All 
economic indicators place Croatia at the bottom of the 28 EU member 
states. Most of the former Eastern bloc countries, which were lagging 
far behind Croatia in the 1990s, now have far better economic indica-
tors. Apart from them, Slovenia, another member of the former Yugoslav 
federation, is also rapidly moving away from Croatia. It seems that tran-
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sition and transformation in Croatia has taken a reverse direction in the 
development of social and economic relations. Instead of implementing 
the suitable and tested models of mixed balance strategies between un-
conditional ‘opening’ and firm state regulation, the dominant actors have 
opted for unconditional ‘opening’ and firm political control of the process 
of creating a new elite.
Most of Croatia’s main problems arise from misunderstanding the con-
tent and importance of the process and performance of democratic polit-
ical and market institutions. The concepts and institutions (economic and 
political) in continental Europe differ significantly in content from the 
same institutions in other regions. By accepting opposite institutional op-
tions, a patchwork consisting of conflicting elements of political and mar-
ket institutions, unconditionally accepted in the name of transition to the 
expected better modern democratic society, was created. The approach 
to transition as an ideological construction of the promised integration 
of the former socialist countries into the European capitalist ‘centre of 
freedom’ contained firm ideological assumptions and estimates. One of 
them was the weak state capacity, for which it is no longer possible to find 
justification in the former political system after three decades of transi-
tion and transformation. If the problems which Croatia faces after thirty 
years can no longer be attributed to socialism or to the liberal concept, 
they can only be attributed to the legal culture and the chosen model of 
political governance. Calling on the political elites to continue the process 
of transition and pursue the same manner of governance is neither justi-
fied nor acceptable. Croatian society must face with the consequences of 
the chosen transition and transformation model. Perhaps a more vigorous 
debate about the results of three decades of transition and transformation 
in Croatia would lead to disillusionment and a decision about the new 
beginning. 
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CROATIAN POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION OR 
TRANSFORMATION: LOST IN TRANSLATION 
Summary
The article analyses some constitutional changes and social phenomena over thir-
ty years of transition and transformation of the economy and society in Croatia. 
The findings point at very frequent radical changes in key institutions and the 
tendency to believe that problems can be solved via formal legislative approach. 
Most of Croatia’s main problems (political and societal) arise from the wrong 
choice and performance of democratic and market institutions and understand-
ing of integrations. The adopted legislation has not provided for predictability, 
reliability, or system stability in key areas of human interaction. The findings 
indicate an ambivalent attitude of the actors towards the state, the political 
system, and the rule of law. After three decades of transition and transformation, 
the failure of the established model of political governance is visible. In order to 
change the model of political governance, there must be an agreement about the 
political role model and the consensus about the fundamental values of society.
Keywords: post-socialist transition, transformation, democracy, constitution, 
society, governance, Croatia
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HRVATSKA POSTSOCIJALISTIČKA TRANZICIJA ILI 
TRANSFORMACIJA: IZGUBLJENI U PRIJEVODU
Sažetak 
U radu se analiziraju ustavne promjene i društvene pojave u tridesetogodišn-
jem razdoblju tranzicije i transformacije gospodarstva i društva u Hrvatskoj. 
Vrlo česte radikalne promjene ključnih institucija i sklonost vjerovanju kako se 
problemi mogu riješiti formalnim zakonskim putem među ključnim su nalazi-
ma. Većina temeljnih političkih i društvenih problema u Hrvatskoj proizlazi iz 
pogrešnog odabira i djelovanja demokratskih i tržišnih institucija te razumi-
jevanja integracija. Količina donesenih propisa nije dovela do predvidljivosti, 
pouzdanosti ili sistemske stabilnosti u ključnim područjima ljudske interakcije. 
Nalazi pokazuju podvojen stav aktera prema državi, političkom sustavu i vla-
davini prava. Poslije tri desetljeća tranzicije i transformacije vidljiv je neuspjeh 
odabranog modela političke vladavine. Želi li ga se promijeniti mora postojati 
suglasnost o političkom uzoru i slaganje o temeljnim vrijednostima u društvu. 
Ključne riječi: postsocijalistička tranzicija, transformacija, demokracija, ustav, 
društvo, vladavina, Hrvatska
